Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, was originally designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms internal to BGP that protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior. This document discusses some of the security issues with BGP routing data dissemination. This document does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
IETF · RFCОфициальная английская аннотация
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, was originally designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms internal to BGP that protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior. This document discusses some of the security issues with BGP routing data dissemination. This document does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
{
"id": "RFC4272",
"number": 4272,
"title_en": "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
"title_ru": "",
"summary_ru": "",
"purpose_ru": "",
"use_ru": "",
"full_translation_path": "",
"full_translation_checked_at": "",
"full_translation_source_sha256": "",
"architect_note_ru": "",
"topics_ru": [],
"translation_state": "not_prepared",
"verification_level": "not_prepared",
"verification_level_ru": "Русская выжимка не подготовлена",
"verification_note_ru": "",
"abstract_en": "Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, was originally designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms internal to BGP that protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior. This document discusses some of the security issues with BGP routing data dissemination. This document does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets. This memo provides information for the Internet community.",
"authors": [
"S. Murphy"
],
"organizations": [],
"publication_date": "2006-01-01",
"current_status": "INFORMATIONAL",
"current_status_ru": "Информационный",
"publication_status": "INFORMATIONAL",
"publication_status_ru": "Информационный",
"lifecycle": "informational",
"lifecycle_ru": "Справочный",
"stream": "IETF",
"stream_ru": "IETF",
"area": "rtg",
"area_ru": "Маршрутизация",
"working_group": "idr",
"source_draft": "draft-ietf-idr-bgp-vuln-01",
"page_count": 22,
"doi": "10.17487/RFC4272",
"keywords": [
"border gateway protocol",
"attacks",
"risks",
"insider threat"
],
"formats": [
"TXT",
"HTML"
],
"relations": {
"obsoletes": [],
"obsoleted_by": [],
"updates": [],
"updated_by": [],
"is_also": [],
"see_also": []
},
"links": {
"info": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272/",
"html": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4272.html",
"txt": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4272.txt",
"datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4272/"
}
}