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IETF · RFC · RFC5746

RFC5746 · Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension

Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension

Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Официальная английская аннотация

Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Связи документа

updates: RFC2246, RFC4346, RFC4347, RFC4366, RFC5246

Официальный источник · 2010-02-01

Полные импортированные сведения карточки
{
  "id": "RFC5746",
  "number": 5746,
  "title_en": "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension",
  "title_ru": "",
  "summary_ru": "",
  "purpose_ru": "",
  "use_ru": "",
  "full_translation_path": "",
  "full_translation_checked_at": "",
  "full_translation_source_sha256": "",
  "architect_note_ru": "",
  "topics_ru": [],
  "translation_state": "not_prepared",
  "verification_level": "not_prepared",
  "verification_level_ru": "Русская выжимка не подготовлена",
  "verification_note_ru": "",
  "abstract_en": "Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack. [STANDARDS-TRACK]",
  "authors": [
    "E. Rescorla",
    "M. Ray",
    "S. Dispensa",
    "N. Oskov"
  ],
  "organizations": [],
  "publication_date": "2010-02-01",
  "current_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
  "current_status_ru": "Предлагаемый стандарт",
  "publication_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
  "publication_status_ru": "Предлагаемый стандарт",
  "lifecycle": "active",
  "lifecycle_ru": "Действующий",
  "stream": "IETF",
  "stream_ru": "IETF",
  "area": "sec",
  "area_ru": "Безопасность",
  "working_group": "tls",
  "source_draft": "draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03",
  "page_count": 15,
  "doi": "10.17487/RFC5746",
  "keywords": [
    "ssl",
    "secure socket layer"
  ],
  "formats": [
    "TXT",
    "HTML"
  ],
  "relations": {
    "obsoletes": [],
    "obsoleted_by": [],
    "updates": [
      "RFC2246",
      "RFC4346",
      "RFC4347",
      "RFC4366",
      "RFC5246"
    ],
    "updated_by": [],
    "is_also": [],
    "see_also": []
  },
  "links": {
    "info": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746/",
    "html": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5746.html",
    "txt": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5746.txt",
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5746/"
  }
}