RFC8509 · A Root Key Trust Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC
A Root Key Trust Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that will allow an end user and third parties to determine the trusted key state for the root key of the resolvers that handle that user's DNS queries. Note that this method is only applicable for determining which keys are in the trust store for the root key.
IETF · RFCОфициальная английская аннотация
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that will allow an end user and third parties to determine the trusted key state for the root key of the resolvers that handle that user's DNS queries. Note that this method is only applicable for determining which keys are in the trust store for the root key.
{
"id": "RFC8509",
"number": 8509,
"title_en": "A Root Key Trust Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC",
"title_ru": "",
"summary_ru": "",
"purpose_ru": "",
"use_ru": "",
"full_translation_path": "",
"full_translation_checked_at": "",
"full_translation_source_sha256": "",
"architect_note_ru": "",
"topics_ru": [],
"translation_state": "not_prepared",
"verification_level": "not_prepared",
"verification_level_ru": "Русская выжимка не подготовлена",
"verification_note_ru": "",
"abstract_en": "The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that will allow an end user and third parties to determine the trusted key state for the root key of the resolvers that handle that user's DNS queries. Note that this method is only applicable for determining which keys are in the trust store for the root key.",
"authors": [
"G. Huston",
"J. Damas",
"W. Kumari"
],
"organizations": [],
"publication_date": "2018-12-01",
"current_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
"current_status_ru": "Предлагаемый стандарт",
"publication_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
"publication_status_ru": "Предлагаемый стандарт",
"lifecycle": "active",
"lifecycle_ru": "Действующий",
"stream": "IETF",
"stream_ru": "IETF",
"area": "ops",
"area_ru": "Эксплуатация и управление",
"working_group": "dnsop",
"source_draft": "draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-17",
"page_count": 19,
"doi": "10.17487/RFC8509",
"keywords": [
"DNSSEC",
"KSK",
"RFC5011",
"DNS",
"rollover",
"root-key-sentinel-is-ta-",
"root-key-sentinel-not-ta-",
"root key",
"security"
],
"formats": [
"TXT",
"HTML"
],
"relations": {
"obsoletes": [],
"obsoleted_by": [],
"updates": [],
"updated_by": [],
"is_also": [],
"see_also": []
},
"links": {
"info": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8509/",
"html": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8509.html",
"txt": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8509.txt",
"datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8509/"
}
}