RFC8893 · Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Origin Validation for BGP Export
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Origin Validation for BGP Export
A BGP speaker may perform Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification use the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs, such as removing private ASes, confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS. This document updates RFC 6811.
IETF · RFCОфициальная английская аннотация
A BGP speaker may perform Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification use the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs, such as removing private ASes, confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS. This document updates RFC 6811.
{
"id": "RFC8893",
"number": 8893,
"title_en": "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Origin Validation for BGP Export",
"title_ru": "",
"summary_ru": "",
"purpose_ru": "",
"use_ru": "",
"full_translation_path": "",
"full_translation_checked_at": "",
"full_translation_source_sha256": "",
"architect_note_ru": "",
"topics_ru": [],
"translation_state": "not_prepared",
"verification_level": "not_prepared",
"verification_level_ru": "Русская выжимка не подготовлена",
"verification_note_ru": "",
"abstract_en": "A BGP speaker may perform Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification use the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs, such as removing private ASes, confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS. This document updates RFC 6811.",
"authors": [
"R. Bush",
"R. Volk",
"J. Heitz"
],
"organizations": [],
"publication_date": "2020-09-01",
"current_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
"current_status_ru": "Предлагаемый стандарт",
"publication_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
"publication_status_ru": "Предлагаемый стандарт",
"lifecycle": "active",
"lifecycle_ru": "Действующий",
"stream": "IETF",
"stream_ru": "IETF",
"area": "ops",
"area_ru": "Эксплуатация и управление",
"working_group": "sidrops",
"source_draft": "draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04",
"page_count": 5,
"doi": "10.17487/RFC8893",
"keywords": [
"routing",
"security",
"RPKI"
],
"formats": [
"HTML",
"TXT",
"PDF",
"XML"
],
"relations": {
"obsoletes": [],
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"updates": [
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"is_also": [],
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"html": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8893.html",
"txt": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8893.txt",
"datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8893/"
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}